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Ann M. Ciasullo, Christine R. Metzo, andJeffery L. Nicholas
Iden~ity:

Cultural knowledgeself-knowledge

disClosure interviews Linda Alcoff

Linda Alcoff, Associate Professor of Philosophy and the Laura J.
and L. Douglas Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence at Syracuse
University, visited the University of Kentucky in March 1997 as part of
the Spring lecture series sponsored by the Committee on Social Theory.
In a talk entitled "What Should White People Do?" she explored the
costs of acknowledging white privilege. In response to the psychological threats white people feel from this acknowledgment, there is a backlash. Dr. Akoff posed and attempted to answer the question of how to
avoid this white backlash. She suggests the recreation of racial identity
is needed and begins to explore exactly how this could be done through
the recognition of our location in a community.
Dr. Alcoff is the author of Real Knowing, numerous articles on feminist epistemology and raced and gendered identities, co-editor of Feminist Epistemologies, and co-editor (with Robyn Wiegman) of Who Can
Speak?, a book on the problems of claiming identity. She is currently
working on a collection of essays on race and personal identity entitled

Visible Identities.
In the following interview, the disClosure collective probes the
metaphysical and epistemological beliefs which inform Alcoff's work
on identity, especially racialized identities. Alcoff makes a place for
herself in the debates surrounding race and identity by drawing on traLinda Martin Alcoff is an Associate Professor of Plzilosoplzy and Meredith Professor for
Teaching Excellence at Syracuse University.
Ann M. Ciasu/lo (Englisll), Christine R. Metzo (pllilosoplzy), and Jeffery L. Niclzolas
(philosopl1y) are graduate students at the University of Kentucky and members of the
disClosure editorial collective.
© 1998 disClosure, No. 7, Committee 011 Social Theory, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, KY. pp. 41 -60.
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ditions in Western philosophy coming out of Hegel and Marx, the critique of that tradition by the Frankfurt School thinkers and
postmodernist thinkers (especially Foucault), epistemological thought
of Hilary Putnam and others, and her own experience of mixed race origins. She discusses the importance of community and recognition for
the restructuring of dialogues on race, the need to maintain affirmative
action programs, and the complexity of our racial identification systems, especially with regard to the visible markers which denote racial
identities.
disClosure: Yesterday at your talk you discussed how individuals need
some kind of group identity to achieve a personal identity. That seems
somewhat communitarian, but communitarian politics are generally
considered conservative. What do you think the relationship is between
communitarian politics and your goals for group and personal identity? By communitarian we mean people like Alasdaire Macintyre,
Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor (although Taylor is not conservative). The conservative classification is derived from Macintyre. The
idea is that if you want to give some prominence to the community,
then the community outweighs the individual, and liberalism, according to John Rawls, is based on the inviolability of the individual over
society.
Linda Alcoff: But the individual is constituted by the society, so it
seems to me that Rawls' view rests on a metaphysical error. I think
Macintyre was right; I think where I differ with Macintyre, for example
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, is on the notion that Christianity is
the privileged discourse. But his ties to Christianity don't seem to me to
be entailed by his account of tradition, the importance of tradition and
community and history, and the relationship between reason and history. So I think you really can't ask the question of whether we should
pay attention to personal, individual identity or group identity because
they're mutually constituted. So, it's incoherent to start the question in
that way.
The question has to be, what kind of social discourse in community
and institutions and the public arena do we want to create (to the extent
we can create one) that will constitute individuals in the best way, the
most egalitarian, the most liberating way possible, that will constitute
individuals as having the capacity for the most democratic participation in the society and the public discourse. And I think that to do that,
to engender the ability for an individual to participate in a moral
project, does require a connection to a past and a present community.
Individuals don't survive their own lives, but communities do last beyond the individual; so if you feel connected to a community you will
have an investment in the future, whereas the liberal market society ab-
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stracts everything to the narrow individual concerns. This is metaphysically wrong, and also then you don't have any concern about the
seven generations beyond, as they say you should be concerned about.
I'm thinki~g about ~nvironmental issues-why should you have an invest~ent in the environment? If I don't have any connection to a community, to a race or an ethnicity or a nation or culture, I'll just try to
make a lot of money and buy a lot of things.
dC: Do you think that your position on this question, that there is a connection between the individual and the community, and that they're
bot~ mutually constituting, is something that develops out of your pecuhar background as partly Latino? Might there then be a larger sense
of community in a typical Latina family than, say, in a Midwestern
American family?
LA: That's an interesting question. I would say there are two things:
one is the theoretical tradition that I work out of, of Hegel and Marx.
Indiv~du~l~ engage in praxis, praxis constructs society, society constitutes i~d1vidual, and that I have found theoretically compelling since I
was eighteen. But, secondly, probably I think those of us who are
marked in various ways-racially and by gender as well-notice the
ways in which these group identity configurations affect issues of distribution of epistemic authority and credibility. Notions about how ra~ionality is co~ected to identity are at work in discourses and practices
ma way that is embedded and implicit and invisible to others. Not that
e~ery person ~f color has that knowledge and perspective, but it provides an experience that can be tapped into when other occasions-like
theory, which is only one of them-make it possible to tap into that.
d~: This sounds like a very theory-based academic project, and one of
thmgs we were wondering in reading your essays is how do you suggest we begin extending this dialogue to the greater community, the
non-academic community?
LA: Well, we have limited power and limited control. The market
forces are on the upsurge; we're at a period of retreat, I think-with the
attacks on multiculturalism and political correctness. There were a
number of sixties intellectuals who went into the universities and produced social criticism. The result of that was this very well-orchestrated
but widely dispersed attack on social criticism, and the social reconstruction projects coming out of the academy push us back. So we're in
a period of retreat. But clearly the dialogue is already being extended
outside the academic community. Race is getting talked about all over
the place, on NPR, MacNeil/Lehrer, Charlie Rose; Cornell West is on
~he TV every other week, the Rodney King incident, also the uprisings
t~ St. Petersburg, Florida-things that continue to happen. I think that
given the disparities of wealth in this country and the way that these
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disparities are grouped around race, there are going to continue to be
uprisings and rebellions. That to me is inevitable and will increase with
the reductions of welfare. Given that, there will be some public discourse trying to make sense of these events and give meaning and interpretation, and I have been impressed with how the public arenas have
made more of an effort to include African-American cultural theorists. I
get frustrated because it's still black and white. The L.A. rebellions
were so mischaracterized, as if it were simply black and white, when
the majority of people who were arrested were Latinos, and there were
a number of Asians involved in a different way. That discussion didn't
get into the national arena. So it's already happening to a large extent,
and what we can do is develop courses. I developed a course on race
and identity-my colleagues looked a little bit askance-what does this
have to do with philosophy?-but there is philosophical work now on
race. So I developed this course. and I want to make it a regular part of
the curriculum. Most of my students will not stay in the academy-we
have a lot of journalism students at Syracuse University, so my hope is
that these ideas will percolate in the rest of the society.
dC: In terms of courses, how would you suggest incorporating into
lower level courses some of the ideas in this course that you've developed? For example, I'm teaching Introduction to Ethics this semester,
and we did a section on affirmative action. My students just didn't
think there was a racism problem any more. I mentioned Texaco, "well
that's just an anomaly." So how can we do some consciousness-raising
at that level?'
LA: You have to give them statistics. I give sheets of statistics, and they
say, "Where'd you get these statistics?" and I say, "The US Government," and they still say-they're so sophisticated now-"oh, well, you
can produce statistics to show anything." But you have to make the effort, and it does open their eyes to the fact that some of the economic
disparities between blacks and whites are getting worse. If you scour
around, there are some fairly accessible essays that can be used in class
as well. The students are often initially resistant, but I think the way
pedagogy works is that you say something to them that they're unfamiliar with or hostile to, and immediately defense mechanisms come
up and they resist. But a week later, a month later, you find out that you
did have an effect; so you can't take that initial total rejection as necessarily the end point of your effect as a teacher. Thankfully.
dC: A moment ago you were talking about the L.A. riots and how they
were misrepresented in the media as a black/white issue. We were
wondering how we can bring to the public dialogue the realization, the
understanding that race is not just a black/white issue, that there's
much more to race. It's certainly not going to be easy, but what would

you suggest outside of teaching students who go to college and take
courses?
LA: _wen, we have to use every arena available; that's why I think the
curriculum reforms that have been targeting public schools are so important. The~e was a very good one in New York state that I was very
impressed with, that my kids have been through, but that has been un-·
der attack.. Peop.le who decide to teach high school are heroes in my
book. Not JU~t high .sc~ool, but elementary and junior high school. We
need to use JOUrnahshc forums also-I think that as academics this is
our site; I d~s~gree .with those who say it's the central site of political
change, but it is an important site. And I think we would do best to use
our own particular skills and proclivities-we need to write books
need to write essays, and in our courses we need to use the books and
essays that are being written.
~C: So would you say that the role of the intellectual is basically confined to t~e. academic setting, to the university? And this is in relation
also to w~1hng books; most of the books, at least those that we philosoph~~s wnte, .are unfortunately not for general use, right? We're not
~ntlng Candide anymore. Do you think that we should change that, and
if so, ~ow? And can we get respect from other philosophers if we do?
LA: Right, we have limited power over how we can change it; Susan
Bo~do and I talked about this all the time, because she really wanted to
wnte more popular, accessible books, and so did I. Then, by the time
you get through .tenure, ~11 these years of academic writing, you don't
know how to wnte anything else! You can't write a good sentence anymore! But clearly, there are people who are doing it; there are public intellectuals.who have been talked about a lot-Henry Louis Gates writes
regularly 1n the New Yorker; it's still an elite venue, but it's a wider
venue. Noam Chomsky is another one. I did a five-day series of lectures
for the Unitarian Universalists last summer on feminism-we need to
take all those opportunities that we can to speak to larger groups.
The other thing that, in terms of political strategy, is really key and
w~at has not existed in this country that has existed in other countries-certainly in Latin America-is the possibilities of dialogue and
teamwork between the labor movement and academics. The labor
move.ment in this country represents several millions of people, mostly
workmg class, increasingly large percentages of women and peoples of
color; and the movement is really changing and has developed better
leadership in creating a political agenda independent of the Democratic
party. There was a big meeting in New York City in the fall called The
Academy and The Labor Movement; AFL-CIO and other labor leaders
c~i:ne, plus Robin Kelly and all these intellectuals came; it was very exciting because they had this big auditorium, and two thousand more
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people came than could fit in the auditoriu~, and they. ha~ t~ set up
sound speakers outside on the sidewalk. So it see~s ~s if this ~s a moment in which that rapprochement could begin. S1m1lar meetings are
.
.
being organized around the country.
There are going to be political differences, there's gomg t.o be distrust.
The labor movement has lots of bad history, and academics te~d to be
elitist, so it's going to take work: but I'm very excited a~o~~ this development, and I agree with the intelle.ctuals there who sa1~, we want to
be a resource for this new progressive, labor movement, we wa~t you
to tell us what kind of work will be helpful." And that's what I think we
should be doing. Not to follow the party wher~ver it tells u~ to go, but
to link up with this movement that is happenmg an~ ~hat is ~he most
exciting thing happening in this country now. And its multicultural
and multiracial and based in the working classes.

race and identity
dC: How is a positive construction of mixed-race identity goi~g t? be
pertinent to what we've just been discussing, and do you do this with a
further political goal in mind? Namely, is it a step towards some futt~re
time when we can eradicate all racial divides altogether, or are racial
categories still useful, and how long will they continue to be useful?
LA: I don't know that we can see that far down the road as to whether
racial identification will or should wither away. I think it's too early; I
think that there's so much work still to be done to deepen people's understanding of how race affects thinking and experience and politics.
dC: So, in other words, you advocate talking about race for our present
cultural and societal situation?
LA: I think we need to explore how so many of the neutra.l c~n~epts .and
practices of community, of rationality, of liberty and of 1nd1~1duahs~,
might be subtly encoded with racial practices. Like commumty and ~n
dividual and liberty, what is taken as absolutely reasonable and r~t~o
nal in white communities is just not the practice in many communities
of color, and then they get classified as irrational. Like some of ~he studies I've seen about how, say, Latinos will give their whole savmgs to a
relative who needs it, even when that relative isn't a good risk, shall we
say. And it's like, from the mainstream perspective, this is irrational behavior, why would you do this? But there's a different sense of t~ese
basic notions of what you do and who you are, and what your obligations are. And I think those things are deeply embedded in and are
thought of as neutral political discourse. We need to have a long period
of self-reflection and investigation of the ways in which race, among
other things, permeates us and our institutions in so many ways. The
positive reconstruction of mixed race identity is certainly important for

those of us who experience this problem, you know, the "tragic mulatto." And I do believe that arguing against purity could have larger
implication because it's connected to authenticity and the notions of
borders and boundaries and so forth. I'm not saying we have to get rid
of racial identifications but of purist ones.
dC: Do you think then that acknowledging some of these categories is a
means through which we can· redefine notions of community or identity?
LA: Yes and I certainly would want to say the racial categories need to
be reconceived. The current concepts need to be problematized to see
that we're all fluid and hybrid in all kinds of ways and mutually interpolated and constituted. So I don't think acknowledging the importance of racial categories means "white people can only talk about
white things" or something like that, but it will show the ways in which
categories do figure into identity.
dC: In a related question then, what do you think of affirmative action
programs?
LA: Well I think they're vitally important, and they have been terribly
misrepresented. I think they were misrepresented as nonuniversalist
because of the claim that they're extending a privilege to one sector of
the population over and above other sectors of the population. Actually, what they're trying to do is to equalize-so critics assume that before affirmative action we were starting from a level playing field, and
then what affirmative action does is it takes people of color or women
and it puts them at an overlook and gives them an advantage. But of
course we were initially starting from a non-level playing field, and affirmative action is actually trying to equalize, and thus, in a sense, universalize the starting point for all people. This explanation doesn't get
taken up by the media very much though.
dC: (Ann) Or in the classroom I think. Like Jeffery, I taught affirmative
action too, and students have really set ideas that it is wrong and it's
bad- exactly what you said: it goes against everything that our country
stands for-very strong beliefs about it.
(Christine) Reverse discrimintion.
(Jeffery) What was interesting in my class is that I had two AfricanAmerican students who were both against affirmative action. One of
them did a presentation, and she said that she would rather be hired for
her qualifications than for being black. And I said, how often are we
hired for our qualifications? And they seemed to think that we're hired
for our qualifications all the time.
LA: Yeah, I've struggled with this one personally. I didn' t get my job
initially because of affirmative action, although I think gender might
have come into it. On another occasion I was given this award and
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somebody said I received it because of affirmative action, and I just felt
like, oh, god, this is so awful. So I know that it can have that effect. But
I'd say two things: some people argue that we shouldn't support it because it won't reduce white racism; white people will just see every person of color in the workplace as only there because of affirmative action. But I think that's a mistake in argument to blame affirmative
action for that; really, the problem there is the white racist interpretation of the situation as meaning that the person wasn't qualified. Affirmative action isn't foolproof immediately, but I believe in the idea of
integration-you see people living with you or going to school with
you or working with you and your racist assumptions break down.
And the other thing I'd say is that I've talked with friends of mine who
also have had affirmative action involved in attaining their jobs, and
it's a personal, psychologically hard thing to think about and deal with.
But a really good friend of mine who got a good job through a special
hiring told me that his view is that it gave him the opportunity to get
his foot in the door so that he could do his work. And he's doing really
incredibly important work on race and philosophy. So he helped me to
accept it as an opportunity to do the work that I believe is important.

the critique ofenlightenment
dC: To shift gears slightly: a moment ago you said arguing against purity has all kinds of further implications, including how we talk about
reason. We questioned whether the concept of reason, because it's
white, is salvageable, and if so, how do we salvage the concept of reason while arguing against purity at the same time?
LA: I definitely think the concept of reason is salvageable. As for the
Enlightenment-I think you have to have a two-sided analysis of the
Enlightenment, which Adorno and Horkheimer had (particularly the
introduction to Dialectic of Enlightenment). And Foucault also has this
in his essay "What is Enlightenment?" in which he defends the project
of increasing self-reflectiveness. So there are ways in which these more
radical, deep projects which critique reason are also continuous with it.
Now, the thing about reason is that the ways in which it is normally
understood today in philosophy and elsewhere-it's not so much that
the current understanding is entirely wrong and useless. Rather, it
needs to be located and specified, which is what Adorno and
Horkheimer do, and which is what Habermas does. I know there are
problems with Habermas, but I think that something very useful about
Habermas, especially in the context of philosophical discussions, is his
notion that there are different kinds of rationalities. The mistake has
been to collapse all of them into this one based on prediction, control,
and abstract reasoning, and to see that as the only form of reason. Such

a collapse has all kinds of deleterious political effects. However, if we
understand that abstract reasoning has limited utility, and is not the
only form of reason, then it is not so pernicious. It would require giving
up the universalist pretensions of that form of reason, and this would
require a very different self-understanding of that form of reason. So to
some extent it would shake the foundation for that notion of reason, but
I think that the way to move forward, to salvage reason, is on the one
hand to recognize that abstract form of reason as having limited utility
and to talk about the multiple forms of reason as Habermas does.
Habermas claims that there's a reason that's involved with the need for
prediction and control, which we have the need for as human beings;
there's a reason that's involved in communication; and there's a reason
that's involved in liberation. And they have different methodologies.
That's one way to salvage reason.
The other way that's very important is to repair the split between
reason and its others that was made in ancient Greece on the basis of
the rejection of rhetoric and sophistry, and in philosophy this split, at
least when I was in grad school, was the reigning dogma. According to
this dogma, all of the rhetorical elements of the text, and the desire and
power that are in the text, are left outside of the analysis, and we reduce
the text to its referential content, and we set up oppositions, and we assess their logical relationships and that's the entirety of the meaning of
the text. But texts always have these other kinds of textual elements,
and I think, like Michele LeDoeuff, that those other elements actually
do philosophical work; they don't simply obscure meaning and throw
up obfuscations. They're actually part of reason; they are part of rationality in the sense of judgment. We're very early in the stages of doing
this reconceptualization of reason. There have been really good critiques of reason in this century, starting with Nietzsche who said that
what's wrong with the dogma is that it takes as the essence of the real
that which is an abstraction from the real. So you have this full-bodied,
concrete lived experience or a full text, with rhetoric, desire and power
all in it, and you abstract from that these propositions that then can be
analytically taken apart-this is what logic does-and you then take
that as the essential reality of the world, of the text, but it's not. It's an
abstraction from the real. So there's a kind of lying going on, and
Nietzsche said, of course, logic lies, and I agree. But it's not that logic's
useless, right? It's that it is doing a certain kind of thing, a certain kind
of task; but as philosophers, I think we need to develop ways to deal
with texts in their fuller reality and to deal with arguments in their
fuller reality as do Habermas, LeDoeuff, and feminist epistemologies.
We need to borrow ideas from literary theory or from post-struc~ral
ism on how to read the multiple layers of a text; we need to develop
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ways to do normative critique, to do epistemic critique, but ones that
will bring in all these multiple layers.
dC: So you would say, then, that Foucault is trying to repair the split
between reason and its other?
LA: Yes, very much so.
dC: And that Horkheimer and Adorno and Habermas are trying to recognize the limited utility of Enlightenment reason and that it's not the
only form of reason?
LA: I think Horkheimer and Adorno are mostly providing a critique.
Horkheimer does some methodological reconstructive work, but
mostly they're providing a critique of Enlightenment reason. Foucault
is also offering a way to begin a fuller analysis of how reason actually
operates in the world and history. And Habermas has also got this reconstructive project. In actuality, there is no incommensurability between any of these forms of discourse or forms of reason, and
Macintyre, among others, makes this argument. When you begin to talk
about things like "white reason," it does sound as if you're going to
lead to a situation in which we can't talk to each other. The reason why
that's not the case is that in this increasingly global world, none of our
worlds are incommensurable-even, I think, between historical periods. Incommensurability really means that there's no element in common. And if you have at least one element in common, then you can begin to work from that to have dialogue. So I think this is a more
accurate description of the situation that we're in. And that's why absolute relativism is not really a danger. There's still the difficulty of adjudicating conflict between different positions, and it's a tremendous difficulty, but I think by problematizing the dominant Western conception
of reason, we're going to have a better chance of doing that. Rather than
saying that there is this one standard and you don't meet it, so therefore, I don't have to explore the coherence of your system and your
thinking.
dC: So, do you think the whole debate over incommensurability, which
arose out of social science studies and anthropology, has been misguided?
LA: Yes, I wrote my master's thesis on Kuhn, and I think that the more
historicist philosophies of science, Lakatos and others, are much better.
Kuhn himself didn't really mean incommensurability and he tried to
retract it. I think, though that part of what is motivating that claim is
this other problem, namely how absolute relativism is detrimental to
intersubjective relations-if you have an incommensurability situation,
you have to have absolute relativism, because you don't have a clue
about the validity of beliefs in other paradigms. Hilary Putnam makes
the argument that that kind of position cannot lead to real respect for
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others. If ~ believe that you have a view that I can't possibly understand, I will tolerate your views, but if I can't possibly understand you,
then ~y toleran.ce for your views is based on a kind of Kantian dutyfollowmg, dev01d of a.ffect. And it ce~tainly doesn't motivate me to try
to u.nd~rstand your views. Whereas 1f you think that you and I share
reahty in some way and also share some discursive traditions which I
believe that of course we do, then you are motivated to try to make as
much sense as you can of the other's position. And that is much better
than this kind of empty, dutiful tolerance of the other. Following
Wittgenstein actually in this argument, Putnam says that you can' t
even see the other as a self or as a subject on such a view, because you
can't really understand them as operating in the way that you yourself
do. The ~eason I say that may be motivating the incommensurability argument is that when the West begins to realize its own Eurocentrism,
and that maybe other cultures are not all inferior to us in reason, democracy and cultural values, it's actually an easier position to move to
absolute relat~vism at that point, because then you can say, "okay,
~aybe the universal teleology we accepted wasn't right (this is what
Richard Rorty says) but we Europeans have our traditions, and we are
within those traditions and we can't know the other traditions, but
that's okay." Such a view doesn't require an engagement with the
other, and I think that might be motivating some people who are attracted to incommensurability. It's easier for European, Anglo discourses to move to relativism than to follow the implications of the critique of Eurocentrism.
dC: T~~ problem of incommensurability consists of how one rationality
can ~~1hque another. Macintyre says in Whose Justice? that a particular
~rad1t~on cannot critique itself from inside, so this leads to the question,
if African American culture is different from white culture, how can the
one understand the other? So your answer to that would be that because we share the same reality ...
LA: Well, also, our traditions are enmeshed ...
dC: .. .in the history itself...
LA: ... Yeah, part of what the Eurocentric discourses have done is to
erase, of course, all the ways in which they have been affected by, influenced by, other cultures and other ideas. I think obviously AfricanAmerican culture is a hybrid negotiation of different traditions. And
Latin American as well. To say "share the same reality" sounds like
~here's t~is uninterpreted reality out there, and I don't want to give that
impression. We share the same reality in that we have to live together
and we negotiate a practical environment.
dC: Would you say that it is impossible for the two cultures not to understand each other because they are not created in a vacuum, they can1
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ves from other cultures because those cultures
not separa te themsel
t' ?
.
have contributed toth etr crea ion.
'bl b
t l
LA: Right. Partial misunderstandings are of course poss1 e ut to a
misunderstandings are not.

cinema-scope
dC: Have you seen the movie A Time To Kill? .
.
2
LA· Yes that movie is an interesting contrast with Dances With Wolves.£
It has the same subplot: white attempt to incorporate t~e les.s;nsb o t
anti-racism. This white lawyer, Jake, wants to be on the nght s1 e, u
he under oes some criticism when Carl Lee (the black defe.ndant) says
" ou're t~e bad guy." So the movie is a process of Jak~ coming to .terms
~th racism and with what it means for his own identity. But white suw~riorit is totally recuperated in the final scene in that Carl ~ee ~earns
J ~ Jake is vindicated in the end as the color-blind white liberal,
s~o~a;h:·doesn't have to do the kind of soul-searching or s~lf-trans~o:
mation that Kevin Costner does in Dances. In this sense A Time To. K1l.l 1s
worse. Jake uses a universalist, color-~lind rhetoric at the begmn1ng
and it's left intact at the end of the movie.
. .
dC· Carl Lee seems to be saying that there is a certam incommensurability, for Jake keeps saying, "oh, we'r~ a ~reat.team," and Carl Lee says
"no we're not." And in that movie their histo:i~s are enmesh~d. ms of
LA· I didn't see it in terms of incommensurab1hty or not, but in ~er .
uni~ersalism or group identity. And Carl Lee saying no, group i~enht~
is relevant here and the notion that we can transcend that to~ univ~rsa
lane is not going to work. And Jake is pu.shing for .the univer~a ism~
~ou can reject that universalism without being com~1tted to an. incom _
mensurability. We are positioned differently, and different social loc~
tions have a tremendous effect in all kinds of ways, but we are positioned differently within this shared history I framework, so we also
.
share a lot of traditions and parts of ourselves.
LA: Did you see The English Patient? It's a movie that takes as its theme
national identities and national allegiances and suggests that these .ar~
essentially unreal and pernicious. The movie contrasts geographica
landscapes-that are filmed so beautifully-and the l~ndsc~pe~ ?f th~
body showing their similarity: they are complex, unique, individ~a
only inadequately captured by names, borders, identitites. T~e Enghs
patient, the hero, is set up as this romantic figure: a .Hunga~ian count,
educated in England, member of the Royal Geogra~hical Societ~, ~om~~
one who respects no national allegiances b~t on his deathbed ~s ironi _
cally misidentified only as "English." So he is someone who resists bor
ders, exploring caves and artifacts, learning a great deal about Arab
culture, pursuing knowledge as if for its own sake.
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dC: So he's the character of universalism?
LA: He is seen in a way as universal, as exemplifying this border crossing, but also, I think his role represents a certain variant of
postmodernism. He symbolizes always an individual, a man who
doesn't want to be named even, because of the way a name will locate
and constrain him. His philosophy is to be simply an individual of the
world, he doesn't believe in getting married, in possessing others, in
putting boundaries around human relationships. And he conducts himself accordingly in the movie in both his private and public life, at one
point allying with the Nazis, at another point with their enemies. Well,
all of this falls apart and mayhem results, and we see that this attempt
to escape identity tragically fails, but I think the audience is led
throughout the movie to believe that his approach is right even if unworkable, and that these national allegiances people feel are important
are really not (as he says at one point, "You ally with the Nazis and they
kill a thousand people; you ally against them and the other side kills a
thousand people; in any case a thousand people will die"). What's so
insidious about this movie is that we see the borders and boundaries of
Egypt penetrated by these European archaeologists; we see the boundaries of women and their relationships penetrated and broken down,
but the borders of "jolly old England" are never even shown, much less
penetrated. So there is this Hungarian count, an aristocratic male,
breaking down borders because they get in his way in the European
quest for knowledge. So the borders of the Third World are in the way,
the identity categories are in the way, and these get transgressed in the
movie, while the borders of England and the borders and hierarchies of
class and gender are left intact!

positionality and personal identity
dC: As a follow up to your discussion of The English Patient, you seem
to be advocating a position in your work which sits somewhere between essentialism and universalism on the one hand and
postmodernist relativism on the other. You seem not to want to advocate either side of that divide, but rather you seem to occupy a space
that is situated between them. Where do you see yourself in this debate
and how do you avoid the pitfalls of essentialism and relativism?
LA: I do want to avoid essentialism. I even want to avoid strategic essentialism. I don't think that's a coherent position. I developed a concept of positionality in a paper I wrote several years ago and which I
am developing further in Visible Identities. There I was suggesting that
we think about gender identity in terms of its position in a social space
rather than any inherent characteristics so that you can think. about
what it means to be a woman and what the meaning of woman is not in

interview with Linda Alcojf

Ciasullo, Metzo, & Nicholas
terms of some internal, core attributes that all women share-which
leads you into essentialism-but in terms of shared social location and
structured space, thus it's positionality. In this way you can understand
that your social status is based not on your internal attri~utes but o~
your relations in this social space. And so, .for exai:nple. :'h1te womens
social status changes vis-a-vis who we re interacting with as we move
through a social landscape; I was trying to develop this concept of
positionality so that we can still talk about identity and the importance
of social location but in a way that will not ultimately refer back to
some essential core.
dC: It also seems to avoid that free-flowing, relative identity of poststructuralism.
LA: Yes, there is a structured grid within which we're operating, which
is open and fluid itself, and changing, but certainly not open to individual, voluntaristic kinds of action
dC: So the locations themselves change, but it's not like we can't ever
grab onto one of them in order to meet as a group?
LA: You know, I think we are (always already) located, and that can be
the way to articulate a commonality between women rather than based
on some internal core. That's what I was trying to move toward: that
vis-a-vis men in every society we're positioned in some similar ways.
We can avoid relativism by understanding the importance of social location. So it isn't that we can grab onto locations, but that we are located. We have agency in that there are different approaches we can
take in response to that location, and there's a range of things that we
can choose to do and moves that we can make.
dC: Those moves are really important feminism, where the notion of
"woman" itself has been challenged. Many feminist endeavors have
been criticized by women of color and by lesbians for assuming that
there is a universal subject or an essential woman; such criticisms have
shown that this essential woman is not universal at all, but rather is
aligned with white, middle-class, heterosexual ideas.
LA: In "Cultural Feminism vs. Postmodernism: The Identity Crisis in
Feminist Theory," Vm looking at cultural feminism, which is the essentialism view, and postmodernism, which is what I called a nominalist
account of identity in the philosophical sense, and which erases really
important parts of identity. I try to work between those two positions.
I think performative accounts of identity tend toward relativism,
and toward a kind of idealist account that focuses too much at the level
of cultural representation and discourse and away from bodies and material reality. We need a more materialist, a more physical engagement
with the flesh and body. Toward such an account, what can be very
useful is Merleau-Ponty's work and phenomenology that is
1
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reconfigured away from universalism. That's what I am trying to do in
Visible Identities, to use a Merleau-Pontian approach to offer a phenomenology of the raced body and the gendered body. I think this moves
away from the problem of voluntarism and relativism because we are
located in these inscribed bodies. It is also related to reason in that reason is related to the body, but what that means, of course, we are just
beginning to flesh out.

postmodernism andfeminism
dC: Have you read Volatile Bodies? In it, Elizabeth Grosz uses Foucault,
Deleuze and Guattari to develop a corporeal feminism. How do you
think one could bring in postmodernism to make a more corporeal, material philosophy?
LA: Well, I think that book, more than Butler's work, has bodies in it. I
think it's fascinating. Generally, though. I don't think we're going to get
a corporeal or materialist account from postmodernism. I'm not as optimistic about Deleuze and nomadic positionality as Liz is, for reasons
that I gave in the critique of The English Patient. I think you get a posturing of nomadism in The English Patient that collapses back to the privileged European male identity formation. Although there are lots of incredibly important elements of Deleuze's work, on metaphysical
questions in particular, mostly what we get from postmodernism is an
internal critique within European-based discourses which has been
prompted primarily by the Holocaust, as well as by the self-determination movements in the former colonies. Postmodernism is incredibly
important and incredibly useful, but it is located as an internal European critique. I counsel a position with respect to postmodernism,
rather than being the acolyte, because I think especially feminism has a
tendency toward dutiful following. It takes so much work to master
postmodernism that you could spend your whole career trying to make
one little move in the language game. Rather, I think like Linda Singer
does, for example, that our attitude as feminist theorists and post-colonial theorists should be somewhat autonomous; we should use it when
it's useful but not feel a need to be loyal. What often happens between
feminism and postmodernism is that feminism gets interrogated by
postmodernism. Postmodernism says to feminism," well you're essentialists over here and you've got a teleology over here," and feminist
theory is expected to scurry around and correct itself. But there has not
been nearly as much of a feminist critique of postmodernism that's
been taken up by postmodernists, so that Linda Singer says it's like the
traditional marriage social contract where the wife has to be very faithful, but the husband is not interrogated for his infidelity in th~ same
way.
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dC: Do you think that French feminists, such as Luce Irigaray in particular, have tried to provide a critique of postmodernism from within
the tradition of postmodernism in France?
LA: Yes, I think that she is doing critical work that is operating autonomously. Her feminist liberatory project is clearly uppermost, and she
will use, for example, psychoanalysis to critique philosophy and philosophy to critique psychoanalysis. But she is one of the only feminist
philosophers who is developing theory herself.
dC: How has postmodernism contributed to conversations about race?
Do you think it has done more harm than good?
LA: Well, where it has been good is at the level of analyzing cultural
representation. In terms of cultural studies, there have been wonderful
studies of cultural representations of others, constructions of others,
raced others; for example, Robyn Wiegman's work American Anatomies
is an incredible analysis. Postmodernism has contributed to an understanding of race in terms of analyzing popular cultural representations.
I think in terms of theorizing race in relationship to the self, a project
important for philosophy and political theory, there may not be a lot of
help from postmodernism. Phenomenology might be more useful here.

recognition and personal identity
dC: If the recognition of self is necessary for a dialogue on issues of racial identity, what is the relationship between group identity, self-identification and the initiation of practical dialogue on questions of race?
You have already addressed how group and self-identity are mutually
constructed. How important is that recognition for a practical dialogue?
LA: In Hegel, the goal of know ledge and the ultimate outcome of the
development of the universal spirit is an absolute coming together of
subject and object. There is no excess, there is no supplement, and thus
many worry about a kind of totalizing in Hegel which makes him politically problematic. But there is a lot of Hegel which is actually useful.
Some people in post-structuralism do these vast critiques of Hegel and
dismiss him, but I think that Hegel is right about recognition. And this
is a struggle with my students as well; they think "well, if I think I'm a
good person, then who cares what society thinks of me. I can just go on
about my business." Hegel insists on the need for public recognition,
and I think he's right.
dC: But you cannot really recognize yourself without the recognition of
the group?
LA: I think we get our sense of self from how we are seen by the Other.
Sartre is right. and he gets it from Hegel. I think as women we may intuit this better because we experience such a disparate number of
selves. In the classroom we are given authority and everyone writes

down what we say, but then in a bar or walking down a street, you're a
cunt; you have this totally different sense of self.
I find this analysis of recognition compelling, which gets us to visibility, and visibility gets us to gender and race and the ways in which
we group ca.tegories of identity. A~d though the ways we group are not
true fo~ all times and place~, certam ways are very powerful right now.
So I thi~k that ~ckno.wledgmg the importance of group identity is necess.ary l~ prac~1cal dialogue. Iris Young has this kind of argument for
affirmative action, for an epistemic credibility or epistemic inclusion in
dialogic encounters in Justice and the Politics of Difference. She thinks that
we need to build into the requirements of dialogue in a practical, political .encounter, some recognition for these groups, group identities and
their effects on reason and effects on judgment, and make sure that
marginalized others are included and have a space in some kind of
way. This is not to say that you don't criticize people who are different
than you. If you don't ever criticize people who are different than you,
you are not really respecting them as thinkers. So the point is not to include the voices, and then say yes to whatever they say. That attitude
does~'t respect .them as t~inkers or their ability to engage with your
own interpretation of reahty. From a position of inclusion, you have to
then build in standards of quality and acknowledge that these can be
a.ffected by deeply embedded group assumptions and cultural traditions.
dC: You mention that recognition gets us to the visible and some would
argue that emphasizing the visible, or looking to the visible to talk
about race, reinforces and reifies race as visible, that one can look for
m~rkers on the body. What would your response be to someone if they
said, well, you can't talk about race and the visible?
LA: Well, I think that the visible is operating whether we like it or not. I
say in "Race and Philosophy" that there is this interplay of perceptual
practices and bodily appearance. And there hasn't been very much
philosophical attention to this. So paying attention to what is already
operating between us is the first task that needs to be done. The worry
about reinforcing race may disproportionately come from white people
who don't want to see themselves as white because of all that it entails:
it's seen as accusatory, or limiting, or you just don't want to have to
deal .with that history. it's the same as "Well, I didn't own any slaves
and it has nothing to do with me," right? So that is where some of the
resistance to bringing in the visible originates, because we're all visible.
Whiteness is as visible as blackness.
To say that visibility is always involved isn't to say that there is one
system of visibility, of the meanings of the visible or the meanings of
the visible markers. There are often multiple systems operating even in
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the same community, certainly between countries. So I am not bringing
.
in the visible to argue that there is one perceptual system.
dC: In your essay "Mestizo Identity" you talk about how people thmk
you are white, and then you say, "oh but I'm part Latino::' and the~
they say, "oh I guess I can see that you have this x, y, or z. And until
you told them they had no connection to the v.isible markers that are
not so obvious. It allowed them to read you.
LA: Well I would say that part of the problem is that modes of perceiving identity are taught and are culturally specific but this is not a~
knowledged much in the U.S. My point in the p~p~r. ':as. to say that this
reaction of people is indicative of the fact that v1s1b1hty ts so important
for race, because they feel like "oh, there's got to be some telltale perceptible trace." The Nazis tried to come up ~ith me~surements of Jewish facial structures, for example, as shown in the film Europa Europa,
because there is intense anxiety about border control. It's tied into
knowing who is, even knowing whether oneself is of a certain identity.
We've got to have these markers. And this indicates how important the
visible has been.
dC: We have been talking about phenotype the whole time, but we're
bothered by how, then, we make sense of classifica~ions of p~ople
based on lifestyles, in terms of race. For example Afncan-Am:nc~ns
call other African-Americans white because they have a certam hfestyle, for example, they are Republicans. Or more importantly attitudes
and beliefs.
LA: I think in that example, when the charge is made, it doesn't say that
your race has hanged but that your cultural affiliation has changed. The
charge is arguing that your cultural affiliation is. not w~at ~t .should ?e
given your racial identity. It is not going against t~1s v~s1b~e. racial
economy; it agrees with it. But I absolutely agree that identity ts in fact
very complex and all these categories are really inadequate to reality.
But there is this tradition in Europe and in the United States of clustering all of these kinds of lifestyles and internal qualities, such as ch.a~ac
ter, and language, to the visible. That there would be some v1s1ble
marker, essentially race, and all these other things like culture and attributes follow from it.

endnotes
1. Recall the CEO of Texaco who was fired and then turned tapes
over to the authorities which were recordings of CEO meetings at
Texaco which evidenced racist comments from the CEOs. This led to
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charges and indictments against Texaco and its CEOs for discriminatory practices.
2. In her paper, "What Should White People Do?" presented at the
University of Kentcuky's 9th annual speaker series sponsored by the
Committee on Social Theory, Alcoff remarked on the transformation of
the character played by Kevin Costner in Dances with Wolves.
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